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Resumo
Cultura de Segurança, Perspectiva Estratégica e 
a Implementação e Operacionalização da Segu- 
rança Europeia
A inclusão do termo “estratégia” no documento sobre Estratégia 
de Segurança Europeia (ESE), gerou um intenso debate sobre se 
a União Europeia (UE) é detentora, partilha ou se deve ter uma 
abordagem estratégica comum em matéria de política externa. O 
artigo revê o debate tradicional e actual sobre cultura estratégica, 
examinando a utilidade do conceito no contexto das dimensões 
de implementação e operacionalização da Política Comum de 
Segurança e Defesa (PCSD). O conceito de cultura estratégica 
é frequentemente empregue no âmbito das políticas de defesa 
dos Estados e das alianças formais encontrando‑se centrado em 
torno das percepções de ameaça e das condições de supremacia 
militar. Estas premissas não se adequam aos objectivos de segu‑
rança da UE, às suas práticas políticas e escolha de instrumentos 
de segurança. O artigo propõe uma distinção entre cultura de 
segurança e abordagem estratégica, relacionando‑as com os 
processos de implementação e operacionalização da PCSD. Esta 
perspectiva permite avaliar como é que os princípios orientadores 
da segurança Europeia informam a cultura de segurança da UE 
e o processo de transformação de princípios em instrumentos 
de política de segurança poderá determinar as condições para 
uma abordagem estratégica mais eficiente da UE no contexto da 
segurança internacional.
Abstract
The inclusion on the European Security Strategy 
(ESS) document of the term ‘strategy’ set off an 
intense debate, whether or not the EU had, shared or 
is required to have a common strategic approach to 
international affairs. The article reviews the traditional 
and current debates about strategic culture, assessing 
the utility of the concept in the context of Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) implementation 
and operationalization. The notion of strategic 
culture is frequently used with reference to states’ 
defence policies and formal military alliances being 
focused on threat perceptions and on the conditions 
of military supremacy. These premises fit poorly to 
European security goals, policy practices and choice of 
security instruments, for which a distinction between 
security culture and strategic approach is introduced 
and related with the processes of implementation and 
operationalization of CSDP. This enables to assess how 
the principles that inform the EU’s security culture and 
the transformation of principles into security policy 
instruments may set the conditions for a more efficient 
EU’s strategic approach to international security.
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introduction
The inclusion in 2003 of the term ‘strategy’ on the european	Security	Strategy	(eSS)	
document	triggered	an	intense	debate,	prompting	as	many	doubts	as	expectations	
on	 how	 the	 european	 Union	 (eU)	 security	 and	 defence	 dimensions	 would	 be	
implemented	and	operationalized.1 Some believe that the EU would have to adjust 
to	 the	new	security	 conditions	 following	 the	Kosovo	campaign,	 the	9/11	and	 the	
American‑led	interventions	in	iraq	and	Afghanistan.	A	few	forecasted	the	divisive	
perils	 of	 competition	 and	 duplication	 due	 to	 further	 developments	 of	 european	
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Others denied it purpose and efficiency due to 
lack of a common strategic culture, military doctrine and robust military capabilities, 
able to match those of NATO and of its most proficient allies. These assumptions 
reflect two interpretations about strategic culture. One that relates strategic culture 
to warfare. Another that acknowledges that its operationalization is supported by 
collective	 defence	 and	 military	 might.	 The	 importance	 of	 discussing	 traditional	
and	new	approaches	to	security	culture	and	strategic	approach	is	twofold.	First,	it	
adds	 conceptual	 clarity	 to	 the	notions	of	 security	 culture	 and	 strategic	 approach,	
raising	analytical	problems	of	interest	to	academic	research.	it	helps	explaining	how	
policies are translated into security instruments and tasks. Second, it contributes 
to understand the specificities and advantages of CSDP of importance to policy 
practitioners.
The	 article	 assesses	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 eU	 security	 culture	 and	 strategic	
approach	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 implementation	 and	 operationalization	 of	 cSdP	 in	 a	
twofold	manner.2	First,	it	reviews	the	traditional	and	current	debates	about	strategic	
culture	discussing	their	current	utility	to	understand	european	security.	The	notion	
of	strategic	culture	is	commonly	used	with	reference	to	the	international	stance	of	
states	 and	 formal	 military	 alliances,	 based	 on	 perceptions	 of	 enmity,	 threat	 and	
military	 supremacy.	These	premises	are	unhelpful	 if	we	are	 to	understand	cSdP	
goals	and	security	practices.	consequently,	a	distinction	between	security	culture	
(relating	 principles	 and	 security	 practices)	 and	 strategic	 approach	 (connecting	
political	will	to	security	instruments)	is	introduced	and	related	with	the	processes	
of	 implementation	 and	 operationalization	 of	 cSdP.	 The	 article	 examines	 how	
the institutionalization of security practices and instruments influences the EU 
approach to international security, following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 1 European Council, 2003.
 2 Implementation refers to ‘development of will and capacity’ (Howorth, 2007, p. 180) to render 
a policy credible and efficient. 
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This	assessment	 is	 twofold.	First,	 it	analyses	how	the	 implementation	of	cSdP	as	
a	process	of	transformation	of	political	will	 into	institutionalised	policy	goals	and	
policy	 practices	 embodies	 the	 emergence	 of	 security	 culture.	 Second,	 it	 analyses	
how	operationalization	as	a	process	of	transformation	of	political	will	and	security	
practices into policy instruments contributes to the edification of a EU strategic 
approach	to	international	security.
a	Review	of	the	Debate	on	Strategic	Culture
The	debate	 about	 strategic	 culture	 is	 neither	 new	nor	 consensual,	 comprising	
different	considerations	with	respect	to	the	units	and	levels	of	analysis,	depending	
on	the	disciplinary	context	in	which	it	is	used.	A	number	of	authors	discuss	strategic	
culture in terms of a grand strategy, strategic advantage or defence policies of major 
strategic	players.	Some	of	 these	 labels	are	used	in	relation	to	 the	role	of	domestic	
bureaucracies,	the	use	of	military	forces	and	military	defence	of	national	interests.	
Traditional	 insights	on	strategic	 culture	are	biased	at	 the	unit	of	analysis	 level	 in	
three	ways.	First,	 they	 focus	on	 the	processes	of	 formulation	and	 implementation	
of	strategic	culture	by	state	agencies.	Second,	they	are	centred	on	how	great	powers	
shape	 the	 strategic	 culture	 of	 other	 actors.	 Third,	 they	 concern	 the	 role	 formal	
alliances	have	in	operationalizing	strategies.	The	analytical	complexity	grows	when	
one	moves	 to	 the	 different	 levels	 of	 analysis	 considered.	 Some	 accounts	 suggest	
that	strategic	culture	results	from	the	structural	power	relations	established	among	
hegemonic powers with respect to military capabilities (Walt, 1990; Snyder, 1977; 
Klein, 1991; Gray, 1999, 2007; Johnston, 1995; Lantis, 2005). From a Foreign Policy 
Analysis	and	organizational	culture	perspective	(Kier,	1995;	Williams,	1997;	Baumann,	
2009) strategic culture is rooted in the domain of governmental elites and domestic 
bureaucracies (See also Legro, 1996; Behnke, 2000). Perspectives on normative 
theory	 perceive	 strategic	 culture	 as	 being	 informed	 by	 norms	 in	 the	 conduct	 of	
war	(Weizsäcker, 1969, p. 2; Finnemore, 1996, p. 154, pp. 159‑160, Rasmussen, 2005, 
p. 70, pp. 72‑76). According to these views, national elites are the main agents of 
strategic culture and conflict management, and warfare its main goals.
 3 Accounts on strategic culture can be divided into three generations of scholarship. The first 
focuses	 on	 the	 role	 of	 hegemonic	 actors	 in	warfare.	 The	 second	 regards	 how	 organizational	
culture influences elites’ strategic thinking in foreign policy formulation. The third concerns 
the	 improvement	 of	methods	 of	 analysis,	 rather	 than	who	 are	 the	 relevant	 units	 of	 analysis.	
For	 detailed	 accounts	 on	 these	 three	 generations	 of	 scholarship,	 see	 Booth,	 1994;	Walt,	 1991;	
Desch, 1998; Johnston, 1995; Williams, 1996; Gray, 1999 and Lantis, 2005.
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Gray (2007, p. 4) notes that ‘strategic cultural understandings are difficult to 
achieve and even more difficult to operationalize’. This happens not only due to 
a lack of consensus regarding the relevant objects of analysis, but also due to the 
absence	 of	 shared	 methods	 of	 analysis	 across	 disciplines.4 Classical definitions 
consider	national	interest,	military	empowerment	and	war	winning	as	central	features	
of	 strategic	 culture,	 departing	 from	 the	 notion	 that	 strategic	 dominance	 regards	
advantageous	military	position	and	that	 threat	containment	 is	primarily	achieved	
by military means (Snyder, 1990, p. 4 and p. 7; Gray, 1999, pp. 136‑51; Gray, 2007,	
p. 11; Klein, 1991, p. 5; Johnston, 1995, p. 46; Rynning, 2003, p. 490). These approaches 
reflect conceptualisations about the effects of strategic culture with respect to power 
relations,	not	 in	 terms	of	 inducement	of	policy	 change	by	means	of	 international	
cooperation,	 empowered	 international	 institutions	 and	 comprehensive	 approach	
to security. Snyder (1977), who first coined the term, defines strategic culture as a 
persistence and distinctive approach (to nuclear weapons) in the face of ‘changes 
in	 the	 circumstances	 that	 give	 raise	 to	 it,	 through	 processes	 of	 socialization	 and	
institutionalization’.5	 He	 perceives	 it	 as	 a	 form	 of	 legitimating	 relations	 among	
opponents.	Gray	addresses	strategic	behaviour	as	that	relevant	to	the	use	of	force	
for political purposes (Gray, 1999, p. 50). Klein (1991) defines strategic culture 
as a ‘set of attitudes and beliefs held by a military establishment concerning the 
political objective of war.’6 Johnston (1995) claims that strategic culture is a system 
of assumptions about the ‘orderliness of the strategic environment’ expressed in 
various	ways	notably	the	role	of	war,	the	nature	of	the	adversary,	the	threat	it	poses	
and the efficient use of force against it.7	Rosen	(1995,	p.	12)	sustains	that	strategic	
culture is sourced in the sub‑set of political‑military decision‑makers, explaining 
how their behaviour determines choices about going to war. Lantis (2002, p. 94) 
observes that strategic culture provides the setting that determines ‘strategic 
policy	patterns’.	Part	of	the	literature	reviewed	understands	the	notion	of	strategic	
culture as being unitary at purpose level (Gray, 1999, p. 51; 2007, p. 6) leading to 
conclude	 that	 all	 actors	 share	 similar	 strategic	 goals,	which	 results	 in	 dismissing	
those	 actors	 whose	 external	 relations	 are	 not	 driven	 by	military	 supremacy	 and	
war.	classical	contributions	on	strategic	culture	adopt	an	approach	based	on	broad	
generalisations (all actors behave alike on behalf of national interests) and causality 
(war as the main instrument to safeguard interests) (See Bull, 1968, p. 600; Gray, 
 4 Groom (1988, p. 109).
 5 Snyder (1990, p. 4 and p. 7) as quoted by Sondhaus (2006, p. 4).
 6 Klein (1991, p. 5) as quoted by Sondhaus (2006, p. 5).
 7 Johnston (1995, p. 46).
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2007, p. 3; Rosen, 1995, pp. 13‑14; Johnston, 1995, p. 49; see also Williams, 1996,	
p.	24).8	Similarly,	perspectives	that	conceptualise	strategic	culture	based	on	the	roles	
organizational	culture	of	state	bureaucracies	and	military	agencies	have	in	framing	
and	solving	security	problems,	are	less	suitable	to	analyse	the	eU	security	culture	
and	strategic	approach.9	They	consider	 that	war	winning	and	military	supremacy	
determine	relations	among	international	actors	and	that	technological	and	military	
superiority	are	the	best	comparative	advantages	of	any	international	actor.
in	a	eU	context,	global	security	is	both	a	normative	and	strategic	goal.	On	the	
one hand, it acknowledges the universal right to peace, security and prosperity. On 
the other, it seeks to universalize, sometimes even to impose, a particular vision 
about	security	and	a	way	to	attain	it.10	despite	the	implicit	eU	instrumental	focus	
(for	instance	how	it	ensures	stability	in	the	periphery	to	guarantee	the	stability	of	
its	core),	its	security	stance	is	attained	through	observation	of	the	principles	of	Un	
Charter (primacy of a rule‑based international order), ‘effective multilateralism’ 
(international	institutions	and	international	regimes)	and	preventive	action	(use	of	
political, economic and legal conditionalities) (European Council, 2003; Council, 
2004, Council, 2007).
During the last decade, the EU evolved from a position of security beneficiary 
to	that	of	a	comprehensive	security	provider.	This	situation	led	to	the	adoption	of	
new security roles focused on prevention of crisis, conflicts and rehabilitation of 
fragile	societies	and	to	further	institutionalisation	of	cSdP	based	on	the	agreement	
of	Military	and	civilian	Headline	Goals11,	on	the	constitution	of	organs	of	political,	
strategic	and	military	guidance	and	on	the	approval	of	the	eSS.
Recent	 insights	 suggest	 different	 concerns	 from	 those	 of	 classical	 views	 (See	
Howorth, 2010; Biscop, 2007; Biscop, 2009, 2009a; Howorth, 2009; ISS, 2008, 2008a,b; 
CSDP Handbook, 2010; Martin, 2007; Venesson, 2010). They stress the importance 
of	global	values,	successful	norm	incorporation,	adaptive	nature	of	strategic	culture	
and	 suggest	 the	 possibility	 of	 operationalizing	 strategic	 culture	 beyond	warfare.	
The	distinct	purpose	of	the	eU	as	a	security	community12	and	of	cSdP	as	a	policy	
 8 Cf. Lepgold & Lamborn, 2001. For a discussion on the supremacy of positivist, rather then 
interpretivist approaches in security studies, see Duffield et al.	1999.	
 9 See also McDonald (2008, p. 570).	Organizational	culture	is	as	much	determinant	over	strategic	
choice and action, as strategic choice and action tends to be self‑confirming of beliefs and 
security practices of specific security communities.
10 Cf. Merlinger (2007, p. 448).
11	 As	 the	eSS	 implementation	Report	notes	military	 commitments	were	prioritised	 in	 line	with	
resources, see European Council (2008, p. III.A.).
12 Adler (2008) argues that “the community (is bind) together through the collective development 
of a shared practice...[that]... constitutes the normative and epistemic ground for action...”	
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instrument	requires	a	different	approach	to	strategic	culture.	The	eU	new	security	
competences	 result	 in	 a	 strategic	 focus	 that	 comprehends,	 but	 evolves	 beyond	
strategic	 bargaining	 and	military	 power.1	 The	 eU’s	 security	 regime	 is	 global	 in	
reach,	preventive,	multilaterally	oriented,	based	on	civilian	and	military	resources,	
humanitarianly	 focused	 and	 governance	 centred.	 Recent	 accounts	 explain	 better	
the emergence of security and strategic cultures among non‑state actors like the 
EU by introducing five main elements. First, security culture entails processes of 
adaptation,	 versus	 the	 traditional	 idea	 that	 strategic	 culture	 has	 a	 static	 nature	
that	 is,	 all	 actors	 struggle	 for	national	 interest	 and	power.14	 Second,	 they	adopt	a	
comprehensive	approach	to	security	problem	solving,	versus	the	classical	focus	on	
war	winning.	 Third,	 they	 combine	 the	 use	 of	military	 and	 civilian	means	 versus	
the	strict	use	of	military	resources.	Fourth,	 relations	among	eU	bureaucracies	are	
interdependent	 versus	 the	 idea	 that	 national	 elites	 have	 an	 autonomous	position	
regarding	their	international	peers.	Fifth,	international	socialisation	plays	a	crucial	
formative	role	in	security	culture	and	strategic	behaviour,	versus	the	independent	
posture	of	states.
Various	descriptions	of	 strategic	 culture	offer	useful	 accounts	 to	understand	
the	eU	security	culture	and	its	emergent	strategic	approach.	Some	surmount	the	
state	 centric	 and	 military	 focus	 of	 classical	 notions,	 defining	 strategic	 culture	
as the ‘nations’ traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour’, as well as 
‘particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with 
respect to the threat or use of force’ (Booth, 1990, p. 121 and pp. 125‑126). It 
places the notion of strategic culture at the community level, it acknowledges its 
adaptive	nature	and	highlights	 the	 relevance	of	value‑based	aspects	of	 security.	
Cornish & Edwards (2005, p. 802) add trust and recognition to the procedural 
aspects of institutionalisation of a strategic culture, describing it as ‘the political 
(p. 199); it is a “...process of... identity formation... where culture, common values and interests...”	
are shared (p. 200). Adler claims that through a community of practice perspective, it is possible 
to	explain	international	change	and	adaptation.	This	is	accomplished	by	replacing	the	security	
dilemmas	and	deterrent‑based	practices	with	security	community	practices	that	diffuse	peaceful	
change via self‑restraint (p. 220). Brackets added.
1	 Some	authors	(Krause	1999)	distinguish	between	strategic	culture	and	security	culture.	While	
strategic culture is a purposeful dimension that gathers ‘both a societal or domestic and an 
international	or	 externally	oriented	dimension	 (p.	 12).	 Security	 culture	depicts	 a	dimensional	
policy, which entails ‘enduring and widely shared beliefs and traditions, attitudes and symbols 
that	 inform	 the	way	 in	which	 a	 state’s	 (...)	 interests(...)	with	 respect	 to	 security	 are	perceive’	
(p. 14). Meyer (2004, p. 4) offers a more workable definition of security strategy by considering 
it as a way to ‘prevent conflicts from evolving in the first place or to pursue certain security 
interests in a coherent and sustainable way.’ See also Rogers (2009, p. 836).
14 See also Toje (2009, p. 4).
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and	institutional	confidence	and	processes	to	manage	and	deploy	military	force,	
coupled	with	external	recognition	of	 the	eU	as	a	 legitimate	actor	 in	the	military	
sphere’.	These	authors	note	that	strategic	culture	is	not	a	prerogative	of	military	
alliances (Cornish & Edwards, 2001, p. 596), a perspective also shared by Biscop 
(2007, p. 9) who considers that ‘no useful analysis of EU strategy can be limited 
to	military	strategy’.	Martinsen	includes	the	use	of	civilian	means,	as	an	important	
resource to implement strategies. He defines strategy as the ‘threat of or legitimate 
use	 of	 force	 or	 the	 use	 of	 civilian	means,	 in	 a	 situation	where	 force	 is	 deemed	
a relevant option’ and strategic culture as consisting of the ‘aspects of security 
that are relevant to the externally oriented concept of strategy’ (2003, p. 9), thus 
differentiating	 between	 internal	 and	 international	 dimensions	 of	 security	 and	
strategy. Rasmussen (2005, p. 70) observes that strategic culture is about the 
‘nexus between the political, strategic and military or operational dimensions 
of strategy’. Meyer’s (2005, p. 528) definition connects value‑based elements to 
the way policy choices are ranked. He considers strategic culture as ‘comprising 
the	 socially	 transmitted	 identity	 derived	 from	 norms,	 ideas	 and	 patterns	 of	
behaviour that (...)help to shape and rank a set of options for a community’s 
pursuit	of	security	and	defence	goals’.15 Margaras (2009, p. 5 and p. 14) observes 
that	 actorness	may	 help	 assessing	 the	 eU’s	 strategic	 culture,	 being	 its	 strategic	
dimension	primarily	focused	on	out‑of‑area	operations.16	Staden	et al. (2000, p. 5) 
argues that a European strategic concept regards an instrumental link between the 
EU’s military capabilities and its political objectives, underlining the functional 
and	material	aspects	of	strategy.
Other	 contributions	 address	 the	 institutional	 conditions	 that	 lead	 to	 the	
development of strategic culture, rather than discussing the conceptual framework 
that informs it. These views consider institutionalisation of decision‑making organs 
and	policies	as	formative	stages	of	strategic	culture,	given	that	it	sets	the	political	
and procedural conditions necessary to select and rank goals and define the 
strategies to pursue them. The report authored by Lindley‑French & Algieri (2005, 
p.	 7)	 argues	 that	 policy	 institutionalisation	 and	 capacity	 building	 are	 necessary	
phases	 to	 the	empowerment	of	a	eU	strategic	approach.17 Similarly, Quille (2004,	
p. 430) points out that strategic culture depends from the development of institutions 
15 Later Meyer (2006, p. 20) added to the definition of strategic culture ‘norms, ideas and patterns	
of	 behaviour	 shared	 by	 the	 most influential actors.’ Emphasis added. See also Toje (2010,	
pp. 18‑20).
16 Quoted with the author’s permission. See also Margaras (2010, p. 5).
17 This report was elaborated in the framework of the project Europe’s Global Responsibility. 
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as policy frameworks. These authors consider that strategic culture develops as 
institutionalization	progresses,	a	perspective	we	share	and	that	we	consider	crucial	
to	the	process	of	implementation	of	cSdP.
A number of authors find the foundations of the EU strategic approach in its 
foreign policy practice by stressing specific external dimensions of it (in particular 
in	 relation	 to	 nATO	 and	 the	 US),	 its	 scope	 (global)	 and	 relational	 dimension	
(consistency,	coordination	and	coherence)	within	and	across	eU	policies.	conversely	
to the last contributions reviewed, Shapiro & Witney (2009, p. 7) show that the 
problem	pertaining	to	the	development	of	a	eU	strategic	approach	does	not	lay	on	
‘institutional innovation’, but on a change of Europe’s approach to other international 
actors, namely NATO and the United States. Everts (2003, p. 1) categorizes the global 
dimension of EU foreign policy and Bailes (2005, p. 15) the global (beyond national 
interest)	and	post‑national	(beyond	sovereignty	and	territory)	dimensions	of	the	eSS,	
as	distinctive	features	of	eU	foreign	policy	and	strategic	approach	to	international	
affairs. In order to improve its international position, Biscop suggests (2009a,	
p. 10 and p. 35) that regular assessments of EU policies must be complemented 
with	 better	 coordination	 and	 consistency,	 improving	 the	eU’s	 strategic	 approach	
towards	other	international	players.	
The	 eSS	 emphasizes	 both	 value‑based,	 functional	 and	 operational	 requisites,	
when addressing the EU’s strategic approach in terms ‘that foster early, rapid, 
and when necessary, robust intervention’ (European Council, 2003). We claim 
that ESS conveys what can be identified as a ‘European security culture’ based 
on: shared rights and values (rule‑based), identifiable risks (scarcity of natural 
resources,	 military	 threats	 and	 energy	 resources),	 selective	 strategic	 priorities	
and ways to address them (Nunes, 2011, forthcoming).18	Through	the	eSS,	the	eU	
ranks and articulates specific security concerns such as: implementation of effective 
multilateralism in the framework of the UN, fight against terrorism, development 
of	a	strategy	towards	the	Middle	east	and	a	comprehensive	policy	towards	Bosnia	
and Herzegovina (European Council, 2004). Further, the ESS provides a narrative 
for	the	strengthening	of	the	european	security	identity,	conveying	what	Freedman	
calls a ‘sense of cause, purpose and mission’ (Freedman, 2006, p. 23). The ESS offers 
an agreed base of goals and strategies that work as a consensually agreed platform 
for the Union’s external action. In 2008, these goals and strategies were assessed 
by	the	Report	on	the	implementation	of	eSS.	The	document	reiterated	the	value	of	
preventive	strategies,	institutional	multilateralism	and	international	regimes	as	core	
18 For a detailed account on how the EU identifies and securitizes threats in the context of current 
international security, see Nunes (2011), forthcoming.
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instruments for the implementation of the ESS (European Council, 2008).19	Having	
reviewed	a	number	of	views	on	strategic	culture,	we	conceptualize	the	eU	security	
culture	as	comprehending	the	prevailing	principles	and	security	practices	shared	by	
Member	States	 and	conveyed	by	european	 institutions	when	addressing	 security	
problems.20	 While	 security	 culture	 informs	 the	 security	 goals	 the	 eU	 chooses	 to	
pursue	in	the	context	of	its	external	relations,	strategic	approach	shapes	its	security	
practices	providing	the	instruments	to	solve	security	problems.
implementing	European	Security
This	section	examines	how	the	implementation	of	cSdP	contributes	to	strengthen	
the	 eU	 security	 culture	 based	 on	 three	 intertwined	 and	 mutually	 reinforcing	
dimensions:	development	of	security	governance	(above	state	level),	comprehensive	
approach	(inclusive	and	broad	dimension	of	eU	security)	and	willing	compliance	
(actors ‘participation results from political will, not from strategic hegemony or 
dependency).	in	the	context	of	this	article,	implementation	refers	to	the	transformation	
of	political	will	into	policy	goals	and	security	policy	processes,	led	above	state	level,	
which	render	the	eU	security	policy	substance	and	scope.
EU security governance
Two	aspects	facilitate	the	emergence	of	cSdP	at	a	governance	level.	On	the	one	
hand,	 current	 international	 threats	 deem	 necessary	 alternative	 forms	 of	 security	
management beyond states (see Kirchner, 2006, pp. 948‑949; Krahmann, 2003, p. 13; 
Webber	et al., 2004, p. 5), given that governments and national military administrations 
are	no	longer	able	to	address,	coordinate	and	solve	global	security	problems.21	On	the	
other,	further	institutionalisation	and	interdependence	of	european	security	enables	that	
19 The Report identifies various accomplished agreements on EU strategies since 2003, notably 
the Strategy for External Dimension of justice and Home Affairs (2005), the EU Strategy for a 
Secure Information Society (2006), European Neighbourhood Policy (2004), the Consensus on 
Development (2005), the EU Strategy to Combat on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Cluster 
Munitions and Landmines (2005) and the Joint Africa‑EU Strategy (2007). 
20 The introduction of a contextual positioning of security principles and practices in this definition 
relates	 to	 the	 assumption	 that	 security	 is	 an	 adaptive	process	not	 a	 static	 condition.	 See	 also	
Kavalski (2008, p. 434, p. 440, p. 442).
21 This occurs for reasons of legitimacy and legality, impediment due to lack of material resources 
or	absence	of	political	will.
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more	policies	are	formulated	at	the	eU	level.	The	evolution	of	european	security	from	
european	Security	and	defence	identity	to	cSdP	provides	evidence	of	consolidation	
of	 a	 shared	 system	 of	 security	 governance,	 where	 the	 european	 level	 emerges	 as	
a ‘necessary framework for the elaboration of security policy, without necessarily 
implying	 integration’	 (Webber	 et al, 2004).22	 cSdP	 comprises	 common	 institutions	
and policy processes that ‘guide and restrain’ (Keohane, 2002, p. 15; Toje, 2009, p. 18) 
the	interests	and	security	practices	of	Member	States.	The	implementation	of	cSdP	
results	from	the	institutionalization	of	norms2, thus reducing the ‘costs of instrumental 
decision making’ (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009, p. 136) and shaping the European security 
‘community of practice’ (Adler, 2008; Adler & Barnett, 1998) committed to normative 
restraint	in	the	use	of	force.	cSdP	does	not	aim	at	guaranteeing	the	eU	a	dominant	
position	based	on	strategic	supremacy,	strategic	bargain	and	military	strength.24	As	
pointed out by the ESS document, ‘none of the new threats is purely military nor 
can any be tackled by purely military means’ (European Council, 2003). According 
to Smith (2007, p. 456) and Meyer (2006, p. 41 and pp. 140‑143) the EU is a unique 
security	 actor	 with	 less	 focus	 on	 pre‑emptive	 military	 action	 and	 military	 defeat	
than	on	preventive	diplomacy,	reconciliation,	rehabilitation	and	reconstruction	(also	
Meyer, 2005). These tasks are based on forms of international cooperation anchored 
to	 institutions,	as	 foreseen	 in	 the	eSS.	The	eU	security	governance	 is	embedded	 in	
cooperation	with	other	international	organizations	and	international	regimes	under	
the label of ‘effective mulitaleralism’ (European Council, 2003, 2008; Council, 2004).25	
The	Union’s	security	culture	is	framed	at	a	governance	level	being	reliant	on	strong	
institutions	 of	 global	 governance,	 in	 particular	 the	 Un,	 by	 promoting	 regional	
cooperation acknowledging the value of multilateralism and by expanding the reach 
of	international	law	pursuing	its	international	activism	in	accordance	to	the	mandates	
and principles of the UN Charter (European Council, 2008).
Comprehensive approach to security
The	so‑called	new	threats	of	terrorism,	radicalization,	organised	crime,	intractable	
and violent conflicts and arms proliferation rather than being unfavourable to 
22 Meyer (2004, p. 7) notes that European strategic culture is not replacing national strategic 
cultures.
2 Cf. Martin (2007) and Youngs (2004, pp. 417‑418).
24 For opposite views that confirm the value of material power‑based elements, see Walt (1991), 
Hyde‑Price (2006), Kagan (2002), Oest (2007).
25 See also Nunes (2011), forthcoming.
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cSdP,	 came	 to	 stress	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 security	 approach	 focused	 on	 causes,	
rather than on consequences (European Council, 2003). It highlighted the utility 
of	 a	 eU	 people‑based	 centred	 on	 the	 causes	 of	 insecurity	 and	 concerned	 with	
relating the internal and external dimensions of security (European Council, 2003).26	
The	eU	 conveys	 a	 security	 culture	 that	departs	 from	a	principle	of	 cosmopolitan	
responsibility,	 global	 in	 reach,	 cooperative	 in	 mode	 and	 humanitarian	 in	 focus	
(European Council, 2003, Biscop, 2007, p. 14) guided by a conviction on ‘benevolent 
progress’ of societies (Rynning, 2003, p. 487).27	The	eU	endorses	a	security	culture	
focused	on	individuals	and	human	communities	as	its	main	security	referents28	not	
states, territories or military adversaries. It covers a transformational policy project 
based	 on	 multilateral	 and	 inclusive	 approach	 to	 security.	 This	 comprehensive	
approach	encompasses	military	and	non‑military	aspects	of	security	management	
(European Council, 2008; European Council, 2003; Lisbon Treaty, 2007), close 
cooperation among EU organs and policy programmes (Council 2007, pp. 11‑18; 
Council, 2010, p. IX) and with other international institutions (European Council, 
2003, p. III) adopting an inclusive approach to the dimensions of security, governance 
and	development.	The	eU,	 through	cFSP	and	cSdP,	embodies	a	distinct	 form	of	
security	governance	that	crosses	policies	and	includes	multiple	intervening	actors	
within	and	outside	the	Union.	it	is	comprehensive	in	the	sense	it	includes	foreign,	
security, humanitarian and economic dimensions of crisis management and conflict 
prevention.	This	distinctiveness	strengthens	 its	broad‑range	approach	 to	security,	
drawing	on	a	diversity	of	foreign	and	security	policy	resources	to	deal	with	security	
challenges	 from	 humanitarian	 aid,	 to	 security	 sector	 reform	 and	 state	 building	
(Council, 2008).29
26	 evidence	a	growing	connection	between	the	eU	internal	and	external	dimensions	of	security	can	
be found on The Hague Programme agreed in 2004, on the Strategy for the External Dimension 
of Justice and Home Affairs‑Global Freedom, Security and Justice agreed in 2005 and on the 
proposal	regarding	an	internal	Security	Strategy	for	the	european	Union:	Towards	a	european	
Security Model presented in 2010.See also Conceptual Framework on the ESDP dimension of 
the Fight Against Terrorism agreed in 2004.
27 The Madrid Study Report on Human Security (2007) also reflected these concerns under	
six	 principles:	 primacy	 of	 human	 rights,	 legitimate	 political	 authority,	 bottom‑up	 approach,	
effective	multilateralism,	integrated	regional	approach	and	transparent	strategic	dimension.	
28 On the notion of referent object, see Buzan et al (1991, p. 26).
29	 For	 a	 detailed	 account	 regarding	 how	 the	 various	 eU	 actors	 operate	 in	 the	 context	 of	 crisis	
management, see Hadden (2009, pp. 46‑49).
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Willing Compliance and Coalescent Responsibilities
A	last	element	relevant	for	the	development	of	a	eU	security	culture	regards	the	
process	of	participation	of	Member	States	in	european	security,	based	on	the	willing	
compliance	and	on	the	coalescence	of	responsibilities	among	eU	policy	actors.	The	
voluntary	basis	of	political	participation	determines	 that	adherence	of	participant	
states	 in	european	 security	 is	bound	by	political	will,	 not	by	 strategic	hegemony	
or dependency that is, compliance does not occur due to ‘threats and payments’	
(Nye, 2004, p. 15). The implementation of CSDP happens on the basis of ‘loose 
cooperation’ (Howorth, 2007), willing Europeanization of foreign and security 
policy (Radaelli & O’Connor, 2009; Torreblanca, 2001; Nunes, 2006), institutionalised 
cooperation and multilateral coordination (Smith, 2004, 2006; E. Smith, 2007; Bono, 
2004).30	The	implementation	of	european	security	is	both	guided	by	constitutive	norms	
based on willing compliance (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 42, Protocol 10) and conditioned 
by	Members	States	constitutional	constraints,	other	multilateral	commitments	with	
respect	 to	 international	organizations	 (Articles	28,	 42)	 and	bilateral	 arrangements	
with	other	strategic	partners.	cSdP	is	also	bound	by	certain	categories	of	regulative	
norms (e.g. Treaty of Lisbon Article 5, 28, 29, 31, 34, European Commission, 2006; 
EU Concept, 2006; EU Code Conduct, 1998; Directive 2009) with formal prescriptive 
effect. The lack of a strict regulative dimension of CSDP is acknowledged by some 
authors	as	a	highly	effective	way	to	implement	european	security	and	an	indicator	
of its normative strength (Pape, 2005; Nye, 2004). While for others, it is at the origin 
of severe setbacks on the agreement on goals, capabilities and effective international 
engagement (Hyde‑Price, 2004; Everts, 2003; Brooks & Wohlforth, 2005), thus 
compromising	 the	 development	 of	 a	 common	 strategic	 approach	 to	 international	
affairs.	The	inclusive	nature	of	european	security	allows	Member	States	to	participate	
on CSDP according to their preferences, specific degree of expertise, level of civilian 
and	military	 resources	available	and	observation	of	Member	States	 constitutional	
constraints (e.g. Ireland, Denmark and Germany until 1997).
The specific character of EU security culture also results from the intervention of 
multiple	policy	actors	with	shared	responsibilities.	The	reforms	introduced	by	the	
Treaty	of	Lisbon	codify	better	the	vertical	distribution	of	responsibilities	(Treaty	of	
Lisbon, 2007; Reh, 2009, p. 646) among various policy actors tasked with external 
representation	functions,	strategic	guidance	and	coordination	of	the	civilian/military,	
30	 europeanization	in	this	context	regards	both	formal	(adoption	by	Member	States’	administrations	
of	regulative	measures)	and	informal	(incorporation	of	value‑based	measures)	top	down	impact	
of	eU’s	policies	over	Member	States	administrations	and	policies.
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security/defence	and	aid/development	dimensions	of	the	eU	external	action.	The	
european	council,	the	High	Representative	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	Security	Policy	
(Lisbon	 Treaty,	 Article	 27)	 and	 related	 supporting	 organs,	 the	 President	 of	 the	
european	council	(Article	15),	the	commission	(Article	17)	and	the	european	defence	
Agency	(edA)	held	various	responsibilities	 in	 the	domain	of	policy	coordination,	
implementation and strategic guidance of CSDP. The ESS itself identifies key threats 
and strategic objectives that require the contribution of different policy actors and 
policy	 dimensions	 to	 help	 preventing,	 containing	 or	 solving	 security	 problems	
(Council, 2003, Part I II; Council 2010a). The institutionalisation of military and 
political	organs	 (eU	Military	committee,	Military	Staff	and	Political	and	Security	
Committee) (Council Decision, 2001, 2001a, 2005) and the Civilian Planning and 
Conduct Capability strengthen the EU political and strategic outlook.
Various	are	 the	views	whether	or	not	 the	eU	shares	a	strategic	culture.	Those	
that deny its existence, argue that it lacks an agreement on ranked strategic priorities 
and suffers from insufficient military capabilities to address threats (Hyde‑Price, 
2004; Margaras, 2009; Rynning, 2003; Anderson & Seitz, 2006; Toje, 2005, 2010). These 
perspectives	 are	 reinforced	 by	 the	 fact	 the	 contributions	 agreed	 on	 the	Headline	
Goals	 since	 1999,	 reveal	 a	 propensity	 to	 pledge	 and	 build	 up	 capabilities,	 before	
outlining	the	goals,	the	strategies	and	the	scenarios	where	they	may	be	used	(Biscop	
& Coelmont, 2010, p. 3; Nunes, 2006; Bono, 2004; Staden et al, 2000; Bailes, 2005).1	
The	perspectives	 that	 advocate	 the	 emergence	of	 a	eU	security	 culture	 are	based	
on acknowledged shared principles (democracy, rule of law, human rights) and 
specific security practices(security governance, comprehensiveness and coalescence) 
relying	 on	 two	 observations.	 First,	 that	 the	 normative	 foundation	 is	 the	 base	 of	
eU	 security	 dimension,	 not	 military	 dominance,	 territorial	 control	 and	 strategic	
bargain.	Second,	 that	 its	 inclusive,	broad	and	voluntary	nature	 is	regarded	as	 the	
eU	 best	 comparative	 advantage	 when	 compared	 to	 other	 security	 organizations	
(Bailes, 2005; Meyer, 2006; Cornish & Edwards, 2005; Howorth, 2007; Smith, 2007; 
Biscop, 2009a).	These	views	 frequently	presented	as	 irreconcilable,	 contain	useful	
elements	 to	explain	how	the	 implementation	of	cSdP	generates	and	 is	generated	
by	an	emergent	eU	security	culture.	While	values	and	principles	shape	perceptions,	
expectations	and	policy	actions,	strategies	guide	security	practices.	The	cSdP	draws	
international	 leverage	 from	 its	value‑based	stance,	advocating	 the	primacy	of	 the	
rights	of	individuals	over	those	of	states	(cosmopolitan	approach	to	security)	and	a	
conviction	on	the	universalization	of	moral	rights.	This	value‑based	stance	underpins	
1	 For	accounts	concerning	 the	 type	of	operations	 the	eU	should	conduct,	with	which	priorities	
and in which scenarios see Biscop (2009a), Gnesotto (2009) and Howorth (2009, 2010).
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legitimacy,	 capacity	 and	 willing	 compliance	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 new	 demands	 of	
international	insecurity	founded	on	the	eU	preventive	and	comprehensive	approach	
to	security.2	Such	approach	is	translated	into	the	eU’s	ability	to	address	broadly	to	
current security challenges, providing a security framework that NATO and Member 
States	tend	to	mimicry.	The	development	of	a	eU	security	culture	crosses	policy	
domains	 and	practices	 of	multilateral	 and	 international	 cooperation	 to	 safeguard	
the	 Union’s	 interests	 and	 those	 of	 human	 communities	 in	 unstable	 regions.	 The	
implementation	 of	cSdP	 is	 an	 adaptive	 process	 dependent	 from	Member	 States’	
political	willingness,	from	the	eU	institutional,	political	and	operational	developments	
and	from	structural	conditions	of	international	insecurity.
operationalization	of	CSDP
The	operationalization	of	cSdP	entails	a	process	of	transformation	of	political	
will	 and	policy	 goals	 into	 policy	 instruments	 shaped	 by	 two	 orders	 of	 elements:	
substantive	and	procedural.	Substantive	aspects	pertain	to	the	fact	that	the	eSS	was	
drawn	during	a	 contending	political	momentum	 following	 the	9/11,	 the	 terrorist	
attacks of London and Madrid and the military interventions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Despite the fact the ESDP emerged during a new threat configuration, it was 
not specifically designed to address it, even considering that there was motive and 
urgency	to	strengthen	the	eU	as	a	more	proactive	and	committed	strategic	actor.	The	
security	logic	underlining	european	security	is	not	based	on	a	zero‑sum	approach	
driven by military gains, but rather by a transformative security project based on 
global	dimensions	of	security,	capacity	building	and	strong	reliance	on	international	
cooperation.	The	procedural	development	of	cSdP	occurred	amid	 the	disturbing	
effects of fight on terrorism and growing concerns with arms proliferation, failed 
states	 and	 fragile	 societies,	which	 reinforced	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 operationalization	
of security comprehended more than military solutions (Council, 2004). In the face 
of broader and less well‑defined challenges to security, the Lisbon Treaty adopted 
various	 steps	 leading	 to	procedural	 operationalization	of	cSdP.	The	Treaty	 set	 a	
single institutional framework to improve consistency, coherence and monitorization 
2	 Lindley‑French	 et al.(2010, p. 2) define comprehensive approach as a “cross‑governmental	
generation	and	application	of	security,	governance	and	development	services,	expertise,	structures	
and	resources	over	time	and	distance	in	partnership	with	host	nations,	host	regions,	allied	and	
partner governments and partner institutions, both governmental and non‑governmental.”
 See also Biscop (2007, p. 14). 
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of	policies	by	various	eU	actors	(High	Representative,	the	commission,	the	council	
and	 european	 defence	 Agency).	 The	 Treaty	 incorporated	 additional	 politically	
binding	 clauses	 and	 instruments	 necessary	 to	 a	more	 effective	 operationalization	
of	the	military	and	civilian	Headline	Goals.
Two	new	provisions	were	agreed	in	order	to	improve	the	eU	response	to	direct	
threats	and	crisis:	the	Solidarity	clause	and	the	agreement	on	mutual	aid	in	case	of	an	
armed	aggression.	The	Solidarity	clause	(Treaty	of	Lisbon,	Article	222)	contribution	
to	a	new	form	of	eU	security	management	is	twofold:	a	better	articulation	between	
international	and	internal	dimension	of	security	and	the	introduction	of	a	natural	
disaster	relief	component.4	This	clause	connects	the	internal	and	external	dimension	
of security and links man made with non‑man made threats or calamities. The 
Mutual	defence	clause	(Article	42.7),	activated	in	case	Member	States	fall	victims	
of	an	armed	aggression	against	their	territory,	imposes	a	legally	binding	obligation	
to	Member	 States	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 common	defence	 and	politically	presses	 them	
for	 a	 common	 response.	 Both	provisions	underline	 the	dimension	 of	willing	 and	
regulative	compliance	of	european	security	as	referred	earlier.
Two	 other	 mechanisms	 were	 institutionalised	 avoiding	 a	 standstill	 of	 cSdP:	
enhanced	cooperation	and	Permanent	Structured	cooperation.	enhanced	cooperation	
was extended to the Union’s non‑exclusive competences’ (Article 20) enabling that 
those	decisions,	which	 the	Union	cannot	attain	as	a	whole,	provided	 that	at	 least	
nine	Member	States	participate	in	it,	can	still	be	implemented	(Article	8	(2).	This	
provision	enables	overcoming	the	effects	of	political	unwillingness,	constitutional	
constraints	 or	 those	 derived	 from	 other	multilateral	 or	 bilateral	 commitments	 of	
Member	States	(Article	27)	 5	over	the	eU	external	action.
The	 institutionalisation	 of	 a	 mechanism	 of	 Permanent	 Structure	 cooperation	
(PSC) facilitates the constitution of flexible coalitions, able to carry out civilian 
and military tasks (Article 43), according to a ‘principle of a single set of forces’ 
(Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol 10) strengthening the coercive capability to CSDP.36	The	
mechanism	of	PSc	by	setting	higher	functional	criteria	for	the	participation	of	Member	
States will claim for a better definition of the EU’s strategic goals and priorities in 
international	 affairs.	Five	aspects	 can	be	pointed	out	about	 the	 impact	of	PSc	on	
european	security.	First,	PSc	binds	up	political	will	with	operational	capability	to	
commit forces, namely combat units for periods that may mediate between 30 and 
120 days (Protocol 10, Article 1). Force commitments will imply a better definition 
4 CSDP Handbook, 2010.
5 See also Gnesotto (2009, p. 37).
36 On PSC see also Biscop (2008). 
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of	 the	 security	 goals	 to	 be	 attained,	 of	 the	 conditions	 in	 which	 forces	 will	 be	
employed	and	a	more	adequate	selection	of	resources.	consequently,	eligibility	to	
participate will be determine by willingness to share risks and commit resources 
based on prior operational experience. As Freedman (2004, p. 16) observes, combat 
and	command	experience	of	 large	units	of	 troops	are	crucial	 for	 the	development	
of	 future	eU	military	doctrine.	 This	will	 give	 the	 lead	 to	 those	participant	 states	
that	 are	 strategically	 more	 capable	 (in	 particularly	 regarding	 deployability,	
interoperability	and	sustainability),	technologically	better	equipped	and	experienced	
in expeditionary warfare. It is likely and desirable that those strategically more 
capable will be the ones to influence the outline the EU strategies, if operational 
efficiency is to be retained. Article 42 of the Treaty reinforced the provisions foresaw 
on	the	Protocol	on	PSc,	supported	on	a	concept	of	willing,	generated	among	those	
who have made ‘more binding commitments’ and the concept of able among those 
‘whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria’ and that have participated in the 
‘most demanding missions’ (Article 42(6), see also Biscop, 2004a). The concept of 
willing	does	not	pertain	to	a	mere	symbolic	manifestation	of	political	support,	but	
to effective engagement and efficient performance. In the absence of a deeper level 
of	military	 integration,	 further	operationalization	of	cSdP	 is	 strengthened	by	 the	
possibility	envisage	by	 the	council	 to	hand	over	 the	execution	of	certain	security	
tasks to a framework nation, in order to protect the Union’s values and interests 
(Article	42(5).	This	provision	applies	on	 the	base	of	political	willingness	and	 real	
capability to carry out a given security task, namely command and control functions 
(Article	44).	Second,	the	PSc	functional	and	organizational	demands	will	press	for	
a better definition of strategic priorities, types of missions and choice of theatres 
where to operate (Biscop & Coelmont, 2010, p. 9). International engagement ought 
to be based on well‑defined strategies and high level of readiness and preparedness, 
based on a clear mandate before, during and after crisis and conflicts, thus avoiding 
the	 propensity	 to	 let	 capabilities	 determine	 strategic	 goals.	 in	 this	 context,	 the	
edA’s	 comprehensive	capability	development	 Process	 is	 an	 important	 point	 of	
departure	to	harmonize	security	goals,	to	assess	which	capabilities	are	needed,	for	
which mission, with what planning, command/control structure and financing.7	
Third,	the	operationalization	of	PSc	will	require	better	interoperability,	suggesting	
7	 comprehensive	capability	development	Process	available	at	http://www.eda.europa.eu
The	future	role	of	edA	will	depend	on	two	developments.	First,	on	the	growing	receptiveness	
of	Member	States	administrations	to	top‑down	monitorization	of	procurement	and	validation	
of ability and performance to take part in military missions at the European level. Second, from 
an	agreement	on	the	legal	empowerment	of	edA’s	role.	
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a	 need	 for	 procurement	 harmonisation	 at	 the	 national	 level,	within	 services	 and	
among	participant	states	and	similar	doctrines	of	force	employment	and	conduct	of	
operations. Fourth, PSC call for a process of force accreditation based on efficiency, 
strengthening	the	edA’s	role	to	monitor	and	evaluate	national	contributions	with	
respect	to	capabilities.	Fifth,	it	will	offer	governments	the	opportunity	to	introduce	
reforms	in	the	armed	forces	and	to	review	national	procurement	policies	on	the	base	
of	tangible	goals,	cost‑effectiveness	and	real	operational	requirements	essential	to	the	
development	of	a	coherent	strategic	approach	to	international	affairs.	consequently,	
it	 may	 lead	 governments	 to	 an	 effective	 centralisation	 of	 defence	 management	
under a EU framework. This may allow overcoming ‘inter‑service rivalry and 
defence industries’ lobbying (Witney, 2008, p. 32), which result in unnecessary 
duplications. Procurement projects must meet real operational necessities, thus 
mitigating	defence	establishments’	idiosyncrasies	and	interests.8	This	will	demand	
a	more	balanced	defence	spending,	where	procurement	efforts	have	to	meet	actual	
and	future	strategic	targets.
Permanente	Structured	cooperation	will	encourage	Member	States	 to	develop	
and	deepen	cooperation,	between	the	military	and	non‑military	dimensions	of	cSdP	
and	to	strengthen	the	conditions	for	the	operationalization	of	a	european	strategic	
approach,	based	on	functional	requirements.	These	demands	will	 involve:
–	 Harmonising	cSdP	goals	and	policies,	 improving	consistency;
– Harmonising EU force concepts, increasing efficiency;
–	 Pooling	resources	in	situations	of	higher	operational	complexity,	enhancing	
performance;
–	 Sharing	 capabilities	 within	 national	 armed	 forces	 and	 among	 participant	
states,	reducing	the	global	costs	of	operations;
– Promoting cooperation in the field of training and logistics, furthering 
interoperability;
–	 Providing	 incentive	 to	 role	 specialisation,	 where	 appropriate	 (Protocol	
10, Article 2(b), particularly on what regards strategic facilitators such as: 
command,	control,	communications	and	strategic	mobility;
– Enhancing expeditionary capability in the framework of CSDP, enhancing 
european	actorness.
8	 For	 a	 view	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 inter‑organizational	 competition	 on	 defence	 cooperation,	 see	
Baumann (2009, pp. 5‑10).
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The	european	defence	Agency	(edA)	will	also	concur	to	the	enhancement	of	the	
Union’s	strategic	approach.	The	edA	may	contribute	to	a	process	of	harmonization	
of	policies	and	capabilities	by	monitoring	and	assessing	the	contributions	of	Member	
States with regard to capabilities (Protocol 10, Article 3). It was also entrusted with 
the task to identify and implement measures required to strengthen the industrial 
and	 technological	 base	 of	 the	 defence	 sector,	 identifying	 the	 required	 european	
capabilities	and	armaments	policy	(Article	42).
Many claim that the edification of a European strategic approach requires 
a better definition of strategic choice, purpose and scope. Nonetheless, a EU 
strategic	approach	is	already	emerging,	when	security	challenges	lead	to	decisions	
with implications in the security field; procedures of consultation on security and 
defence are institutionalised and security tasks are conducted. All this is more 
than	a	 formalization	of	political	 consensus.	 it	derives	 from	shared	believes	about	
security	goals,	means	and	ends.	The	limitations	to	the	operationalization	of	cSdP,	
especially on occasions of international crisis, are more likely to depend from 
european	governments	domestic	constraints	than	to	the	inability	of	the	eU	to	deliver	
as	 a	 security	 provider.	 in	 situations	 of	 international	 instability,	 where	 military	
alliances	 and	 great	 powers	 are	 unwelcomed	 or	 unsuitable,	 the	 eU	may	 prove	 to	
be	 the	better	 security	partner	due	 to	 its	 self‑portrayed	 image	as	 a	normative	and	
benign	security	actor.	The	cSdP	is	not	a	device	to	counter‑weight	classical	security	
dilemmas,	but	a	policy	to	address,	prevent	and	manage	broader	security	problems,	
complementing and filling important security gaps that other security organizations 
are unable to meet, in particularly in the domain of crisis and conflict prevention 
and post‑conflict management.
Conclusions
The	article	discussed	traditional	and	new	approaches	to	strategic	culture	having	
considered	 the	various	units	 and	 levels	 of	 analyses	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	 they	
are	helpful	to	explain	a	eU	strategic	approach	to	international	affairs.	established	
views	 on	 strategic	 culture	 are	 based	 on	 states’	 bureaucracies	 as	 the	 enablers	 of	
strategy;	 on	military	 threat	 as	 an	 essential	 condition	 for	 strategies	 to	 emerge;	 on	
military	 superiority,	 bargain	 and	 warfare	 as	 the	 ends	 of	 strategies	 and	 military	
resources as the best mean to accomplish them. These elements proved to fit poorly 
to	 european	 security.	 The	 eU	 does	 not	 share	 a	 strategic	 culture	 in	 the	 classical	
sense,	given	its	value	and	normative	approach	to	security,	its	wide‑ranging	way	to	
address	security	problem‑solving	and	its	complex	set	of	external	relations	binding	
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the field of security with those of governance and development. European security 
culture	 emerges	 from	 a	 security	 regime	where	 stability	 is	 a	 normative	 goal	 and	
international	 cooperation	 the	 main	 instrument	 to	 accomplish	 it.	 We	 overcame	
the difficulties inherent to classical notions of strategic culture by analysing how 
political	will	is	transformed	into	security	policy	instruments	and	actions.	We	sought	
to solve the weak relation found in the literature between security culture based 
on	 principles	 and	 security	 practices,	 and	 strategic	 approach	 pertaining	 to	 policy	
action	 and	 instruments.	 The	 article	 connected	 security	 perceived	 as	 a	 condition	
necessary	to	stability,	to	strategy	as	the	way	to	perpetuate	or	restore	security	in	a	
situation	of	contending	interests.	This	distinction	was	then	applied	to	the	analysis	
of	cSdP,	respectively	from	the	point	of	view	of	implementation	(institutionalization	
of	policy	goals,	policies	and	processes)	and	operationalization	(presence	of	policy	
instruments	enabling	security	action).
The	eU	strategic	culture	results	from	patterns	of	differentiation	that,	although	
consistent	with	in‑group	representations	are	not	necessarily	structured	around	the	
notions	of	enmity,	military	superiority	or	strategic	gain.	in	classical	views,	states’	
administrations	 have	 the	 monopoly	 of	 strategic	 culture,	 being	 formal	 alliances	
responsible	for	its	operationalization.	This	reflects	conceptualisations	of	security	
and strategy that may shape the subjective perceptions of national security and 
defence	administrations,	but	 that	offer	 little	explanation	about	 the	eU	emergent	
security	 culture	 and	 strategic	 approach,	 as	 depicted	 in	 the	 eSS	 and	 assessed	
by	 the	 implementation	 Report.	 The	 cSdP,	 despite	 being	 intergovernmental,	 is	
implemented	and	operationalized	with	the	intervention	of	various	policy	actors,	
crossing	policy	issues	and	policy	domains.	The	eU	security	culture	is	comprehensive	
in	scope,	incorporating	the	levels	of	security,	governance	and	development,	with	
a	 strong	 focus	 on	 institutional	 multilateralism.	 its	 inclusive	 strategic	 approach	
induces	cooperation	rather	than	rivalry	and	competition.	The	eU	emergent	security	
culture	departs	 from	attempts	 to	universalize	 a	demo‑liberal	 value‑base	 system	
(democracy,	 rule	 of	 law,	 human	 rights	 and	 international	 law).	 This	means	 that	
the	 conduct	 underpinning	 the	 eU	 security	 culture	 is	 not	 strictly	 related	 to	 the	
interests	of	Member	States’	administrations	and	eU	organs	and	representatives,	
but	 drawn	 from	 international	 norms	 and	 principles,	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	
United	nations	charter.
The	 article	 asserts	 that	 the	 implementation	 of	 cSdP	 comprehends	 diverse	
preferences	of	Member	States,	european	 institutions	and	communities	of	security	
and	defence	 experts.	A	number	 of	 shared	understandings	 among	Member	 States	
can be identified concerning the principles that guide the EU’s international action 
(democracy,	 human	 rights,	 good	 governance	 and	 international	 law)	 shaping	 its	
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security practices (multilateralism, preventive action, ownership and post conflict 
management).	The	articulation	between	implementation	of	european	security	and	
security	 culture	will	 be	 stronger,	 as	 security	 challenges	 increase	 interdependence	
among	Member	States	and	external	conditions	require	 further	 institutionalization	
of	 eU	 policies.	 This	will	 contribute	 to	 the	 hybridization	 of	 security	 cultures	 and	
strategic	focuses	among	eU	policy	actors	and	Member	States.
The	development	of	a	eU	strategic	approach,	namely	through	cSdP,	has	less	to	
do	with	a	military	advantageous	dimension	of	eU	security	than	with	a	preventive	
and global outlook towards actual or potential security challenges. The EU strategic 
focus	will	comprehend,	but	evolve	beyond	the	use	of	military	force.	This	approach	is	
attained	by	promoting	regional	and	international	cooperation,	by	inducing	effective	
and	legitimate	ownership	of	security	problem‑solving	and	by	actively	engaging,	if	
and	when	required,	with	military	means.
The	 response	 to	 security	 problems	 will	 be	 less	 guided	 by	 Member	 States’	
strategic outlooks, than by how much external threats and domestic conditions 
will	 demand	 for	 better	 multilateral	 solutions.	 The	 development	 of	 eU	 security	
will	 not	 progress	 as	 integration	 deepens,	 but	 ratter	 as	 interdependent	 security	
among	 states	 narrows.	 The	 prioritisation	 of	 strategic	 goals	 will	 be	 conditioned	
by	 the	 future	 developments	 of	 a	 eU’s	 strategic	 culture	 and	 strategic	 approach,	
intended	 to	 tone	down	negative	 representations	of	Other.	This	 occurs	 at	 a	 time	
when Member States, especially those who are major contributors to European 
security	 (UK,	 France,	 Germany	 and	 The	 netherlands),	 are	 adopting	 public	
discourses	 and	 policy	measures	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 national	 security,	 emigration	
and	counter‑terrorism	that	may	hamper	the	perceptions	of	a	benign	and	normative	
EU. Further research is necessary on the CSDP transformational global project (as 
commonly	addressed	in	the	context	of	foreign	and	security	policy)	and	the	more	
territorial	and	regulated	dimension	of	the	Union’s	internal	security	dimension,	in	
order	 to	evaluate	how	 the	course	of	 these	 two	policy	dimensions	will	 affect	 the	
eU´s	strategic	approach	to	 international	affairs.
The articles suggests that the institutionalization of instruments like Enhanced 
cooperation	and	PSc	by	placing	a	higher	level	of	functional	demand	on	participant	
states are likely to improve consistency, enhance performance and reduce the costs 
of international missions. A fully fledge CSDP will claim for internal reforms of 
national	 defence	 administrations,	 better	 coordination	 between	 the	 military	 and	
civilian	 dimensions	 of	 security	 and	 improved	 cooperation	 with	 other	 security	
organizations, if a balance between cost‑efficiency is to be achieved.
Further developments of European security and a better definition of its strategic 
focus	will	depend	on	various	steps.	First,	the	agreement	on	a	method	of	european	
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strategic	review	based	on	successful	security	practices	drawn	from	lessons	learnt.	
Second,	the	security,	governance	and	development	dimensions	of	the	eU	external	
relations	 will	 require	 a	 better	 and	 mutually	 reinforcing	 coordination	 among	
EU institutions and Member States administrations. Third, adjust the EU policies 
and	 instruments	 to	what	 the	Union	does	better	based	on	wide‑ranging	 resources	
and	 broad	 expertise,	 in	 particular	 in	 preventive	 crisis	 management	 and	 post‑	
‑conflict resolution, strengthening its comparative advantage as compared to other 
security	 organizations.	 Fourth,	 the	 eU	 should	 provide	 the	 security	 goods,	which	
states individually are no longer able to deliver and complementing or taking the 
lead,	where	 other	 international	 security	 organizations	 are	 unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	
intervene.
The future of European security depends on well‑defined policy goals, 
strategies	and	stronger	capabilities,	but	also	on	how	national	security	and	defence	
administrations	will	perceive	the	advantages	of	european	security.	The	current	budget	
constraints	and	the	general	climate	of	ontological	insecurity	pose	challenges	to	the	
development	of	structures	of	security	governance,	in	europe	and	in	the	transatlantic	
context.	 in	 the	absence	of	security	organizations,	states	will	be	unwilling	on	their	
own	 to	allocate	 scarce	 resources	 to	 respond	 to	 security	challenges	and	 threats.	 in	
their presence, they face the choice to balance their economies and justify cuts in 
public spending, while fulfilling the financial and material demands of common and 
collective security. This situation will press the EU for a more efficient implementation 
and	operationalization	of	cSdP	guided	by	tangible	goals,	preventive	strategies	and	
selective security tasks, notably crisis and conflict prevention, state reconstruction 
and development. A consensus on the EU’s future security tasks is likely to be 
more	relevant	 than	a	perfectly	harmonized	strategic	culture,	born	out	of	complex	
hybridization	of	Member	States	security	cultures.
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